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Summary 
Legitimacy and impartiality in prosecution. 
A cornparisen, of the relation between t l~e  public prasccutiain service 
and the minister of Justice in France, Italy and the Netherlands 
The relation between the prosecul~on service and pollt~cal bridles is marked by a 
tetlsio~l between deniandss of' bat11 democratic legltinnacy and i~~~parlhal ob~cctiuity. 
Each legal system has to meet ~hese  demands in some way. This book aktempts to shozl~ 
Blow the systems of the Netherlands, France and Italy approach this mauer, wl~~cZl 
argwrvrcrhts lie behind and which re/'ornls could be underlaken in ihls regard. 
For each country. firstly, an analysis is set out of the position of the prosecution service 
within the consXi~letionaY karnework. TYI~II a11 outline follows of the orgax~isatioa~al 
structure of the aforesad service and of its powers under crirniraal ltzw. After Illat. a de- 
scnptian is given of h e  role and Uae various powers o l ' d~e  rnitllster ol'.lust~ce. h.:inally, 
the research rnto each system ends win11 a study oi-the accoi1nvubili0y of the ~ninistcr to 
parliament. 
The corrclusio~is to these country analyses can be sutntlr~arized as Ibllows. '1 he Tlutclu 
proseczltron sewjce and ~niiiister of Justice relate to each other by colxsu1Liclg together 
on an equal bas~s.  The minister is empowered to be ~rrl'orrned about even llze detnlls ol' 
criminal cases. Prosec~~tors are totally subordi11are in legal status, aln1ioiagl-1 dlis does not 
appear to poliricise thc proseculia~i. Tlae minister is cntitled lo mder any kind of pro- 
secutarial actlon to be talcen or to be stopped. In practice his i~.rilucnce nearly O I I Y ~ .  lakes 
rhe form of consultarl~on. On a number of occasuo~is tlais us done on the instalzce o r  par- 
liiamene, which scruti~lizes the lni~iislter closely. 
The French relation between llze prosecution service and politics 1s in a phase of 
change. The current legislation gives the rninister a donavrrailt role, checked by an ad- 
visory function of the High Council of the Magistracy. T h ~ s  latutary s~tuarion 1.; con- 
trasted by tlze official policy o f  some of the govern~lnenis from the end of last celilury 
on. Thls pealicy was to follow all advice conccrrling appountments and disciplinary ac- 
trans. Also, the lniiiister no longer gave any ordcrs In specific crixr~inal cnscs, but only 
issues general direct~ves can ~natters of prosecuticrn. SIIII, 01' the I11~11l;s;l 
prosecutor funelions are of a marked politic~sed nature. i3arliamet;11 plays a radicr urls~g- 
nificantl part !n this fjeld. The rnilvistcr can afLhrd to take a pasczvc autnudc, zvhulr ltc 
does not have to fear parlran~entary sanctions. 
Contradicaon rules thre Italian posihions of' tile polltical bodies and the pmseeulors. 'Thc 
prosecution servlcc is highly ~ndependezlt fro113 the govcr~~t?ienl, who 11z;ls no sily rn llrchr 
lcgal status or their runctiolial activity. TIx prosecutors sltbll do excrcisc powe1.s ofslm- 
~Yar importance as those 117 the afcrrctneniinned countries. 011 ~ h c  othcr hanrl, 1l1c scrvlec 
is sub.ject to a pri~~ciple of legality of" ~ l - I C  prosccutton, whnch stales ilaal every crrme 
notlcr: ]Ias to lead 10 prosec~~tion. De fact0 tlie ~ ~ O S C C L I ~ O T  does exercise il~scrctionl In de- 
clding w h l c l ~  cases slaould be p r ~ o r ~ t ~ s e d  an  which not. 'The lailer cases sllll end LIP bc- 
qng dismissed in long mn. Furlhermore, although lhc goverl?lnetlL C a r l  exercise lilllc 
influence on criminal cases, fbr these 11 does answer to parlrament. Mcmbers 01" psurlra- 
mellt can receive deta~led critnlnal irrlbrn?at~on Tram the m~nistcr, 01 ~h i r~ugh  quasr-per- 
manerrt commiss~ons of inquiry. 
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The Italian prosecutllon service appears to be comparatively the most autonaillous in 
legal ecrms. In camparibon with the Netherlands, Psance sub~ects its proseculars "l a 
more restricted range of ministerial orders. In the practice of all! three countries the 
prosecutlola service enjoys some autonomy in legal scatus, In particular cancel-~rning 
appoinkments b lower functions. Practjce also shows independent decision making in 
individual cases. Also, no poPiiical body in any of  these countries imposes any direc- 
tives 1ha1 indicate which type of case should be nrealed wirSgout priority. 
The descriptive analysis above can 'be paired with an investigation into the valid~ry of 
the reasons behind the existing juridical relation bemeen prosecution sewice and 
politics. At this point democratic legitimacy sets certaililr demands. Slnce the prase- 
cudors h~ave n discrekiot? in their decisioris md the power wl~ether lo initiate a proce- 
dure, political bodies should l ~ a v e  a say in the general policy of the prosecution. A 
sccosld conclusiianr also regards the prosccutiorl service's discretion not to prosecute an 
offendor for an act pil~nishnble under criminal law. If the prosecutor nzay decide not lo 
prosecule firr other than legal reasoils, tlven the govetmnqent needs to be able to bring 
about a contrary decisron. The demand for impartiality under the rule a f Ia '~v  on the 
other hard imposes restraint from1 political interference in criminal cases. This shoiald 
be li~rthered by rnini~nizir~g govern~rrelncal influence in h e  legal slatus of individual 
prosecutors. 
These conclusions promote ideas for change in the system that governs the relation be- 
tween politicians and prosecutors. Firstly, szn appeal c o ~ ~ l d  be instituted against minis- 
lerlal orders regarding specific eases. Seco~zdly, sympathy exists for creating a national 
public prosecutor leading the prosecution service, while enjoying a certain f~~nct ional  
autonomy. A further suggesaion for reform is to give paslia~lilenk the task of setting di- 
rectives on the general prosecution policy. This option could be o f  particular interest to 
the Italian situation. Lastly, an independent legal slatus for prosecutors could be com- 
billed with a limitation cafu~~inisterial influence to general directives. Variations ofthesc 
could t2mctior1 \veil in bod1 France and d ~ e  NctherEoads. 
